Why should nationalism outweigh regionalism?

National and regional identities in Spain

Content overview

1. Introduction: Contemporary relevance of the concepts of nation and national movements
1.1. Goals of work
1.2. Problem sketching and questions
1.3. Structure of the work

2. Theoretical approaches
2.1. States, Nations and Regions
2.2 Typological differentiation of the national self-image: Ethnos - Demos - Concept according to Francis .11
2.3. Identity Concepts
2.4. Historical development and current situation in Spain
2.5. Developments in nationalisms and regionalisms
2.6 Overview of the current state of empirical research on national / regional identity
2.7. Hypotheses

3. Methodical approach: Presentation of the data set
3.1. Specifics of the data collected in Spain
3.2 Examined regions of the evaluation
3.3. Operationalization of collective identity as well as the ethnos and demos concept

4. Empirical part
4.1. Descriptive statistics: collective identity (s) in Spain and objective characteristics
4.2. Inductive statistics

5. Results for the Spanish regions
5.1. The Basque situation based on the WVS
5.2. Assessment of the informative value of the data for the Basque Country ... 123
5.3. The Catalan situation based on the WVS
5.4. Assessment of the informative value of the data for Catalonia
5.5. The Galician situation according to data from the WVS
5.6. Assessment of the informative value of the data for Galicia
5.7. Situation in Andalusia and Valencia
5.8. Assessment of the significance of the data for Andalusia and Valencia
5.9. Overall criticism of the Word Values ​​Survey questionnaire

6. Overall Spanish situation and future problems of overall Spanish politics

List of tables

Table 1: Objective and subjective concept of nation

Table 2: Summary of ethical / demotic understanding of nations

Table 3: Driving forces of regionalism

Table 4: Per capita income and unemployment rate for selected regions

Table 5: National / regional awareness

Table 6: Percentages of respondents who consider their region to be a “nation” over time

Table 7: Importance of Spain for the regions

Table 8: Overview of the survey waves, research institutes and number of respondents.

Table 9: Documented DATA regions in 1990

Table 10: Overview of variables Ethnos demos

Table 11: National / regional awareness

Table 12: Summary presentation of the identities in 1996

Table 13: Sociodemography 1996

Table 13a: Significance for regions: sociodemography

Table 14: Distribution of the regional population by place of birth in 1996

Table 15: Regional languages ​​in the regions in 1996

Table 16: List of national parties - regional parties

Table 17: Frequencies for voting intent of a national vs. regional party in 1996

Table 18: Intentions to vote in 1996 in the Basque Country and Galicia

Table 19: Voting intentions in 1996 in Valencia and Catalonia

Table 19a: Significance for regions: right-left classification

Table 20: Significance of identities: right-left classification

Table 21: Summary of results for the Basques

Table 22: Summary of results for the Catalans

Table 23: Summary of results for the Galicians

Table 24: National pride in 1990 by region and national pride in 1996 by region and identity

Table 24a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions: national pride

Table 25: National military defense for regions in 1990 and for regions and identities in 1996

Table 25a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions: national defense

Table 26: Attitudes towards foreigners and foreign goods, 1996

Table 26a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions: foreigners / goods

Table 27: Ethnic and social tolerance 1996

Table 27a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions: tolerance

Table 28: Government task: order vs. freedom 1996

Table 28a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions

Table 29: Country destinations Spain 1996

Table 30: Democracy Index 1996

Table 30a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions

Table 31: Understanding of democracy indices 1996

Table 31a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions: indices for understanding democracy

Table 32: Willingness to use force in 1996

Table 32a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions: use of force

Table 33: Correlations for trust in institutions in the respective regions, 1996

Table 34: Trust in institutions 1996

Table 35: Satisfaction with the central government in 1996

Table 35a: Significance for mean values ​​of the regions: Government satisfaction

Table 36: Overview of Spanish regions

Table 37: Geographical identification of the regions

Table 38: Geographical identification of the Spanish identities in 1996

Table 39: School education in the Spanish regions in 1996

Table 40: Gender of the Spanish regions and identities in 1996

Table 41: Party elected in 1996 in Spain

Table 42: Mean values ​​right-left classification

Table 43: National pride frequencies per region, 1996

Table 44: National pride - objects 1 1990

Table 45: National pride - objects2 1990

Table 46: Preference of Spanish workers when jobs are scarce in 1996

Table 47: Democracy best political system for the country in 1996

Table 48: Democracy better than other systems in 1996

Table 49: Attitudes towards the political system then and now, 1996

Table 49a: Significance regions: Franco 1996 political system

Table 49b: Significance identities: Franco political system

Table 49c: Significance regions: political system today

Table 49d: Significance identities: political system today

Table 49e: Significance regions: political system future

Table 49f: Significance identities: political system future 1996

Table 50: Political System Index (column percent) 1996

Table 51: Individual values ​​for understanding democracy 1 1996

Table 52: Individual values ​​for understanding democracy in 1996

Table 53: Political interests of the regions and identities in 1996

Table 53a: Significance of political interest

Table 54: Political participation

Table 55: Trust in institutions

Table 56: Trust in fellow human beings

Table 57: Trust in Spanish citizens in 1990

Table 57a: Significance of trust

List of figures

Figure 1: Development phases of nationalism

Figure 2: Catalan and Basque views on independence

Figure 3: Identities and Descriptive Variables

Figure 4: Dependent variables and identities

Figure 5: Foreigners in Spain

Figure 6: Spain by language area

Figure 7: Right-left classification of the Spanish population in 1996

Figure 8: National pride in Spain over time

Figure 9: Trust in institutions in Spain across three survey waves

Figure 10: Trust in institutions in the respective region in 1996

Figure 11: Spanish electoral system

Figure 12: Basque Country election results 1980-2001

List of abbreviations

Figure not included in this excerpt

1. Introduction: Contemporary relevance of the concepts of nation and national movements

Processes of globalization and the formation of larger, supra-state units, regionalization and federalization have not contributed to national autonomy and independence movements disappearing from the scene in recent years (Northern Ireland, Quebec, Basque Country) (Westle, 1999a: 279).

In the 20th century there were various waves of state and nation building[1]. They went hand in hand with the collapse of existing states or the dissolution of alliances. They were accompanied by numerous minority and nationality conflicts, such as the collapse of the communist regime in the Soviet Union and its accompanying processes in Eastern Europe (Haller 1993: 30). With the onset of regime change, an explosive mixture between democratic and national questions emerged in a large number of societies behind the former Iron Curtain (Kraus 1996: 49).

Also in Western Europe, national, regional, local and related cultural movements are increasing or resurrecting. Some of these are expressed in independence movements, such as in the Spanish Basque Country. Also tendencies that strong national sub-regions[2] are critical of their own national governments can be seen (Leggewie 1994: 48). This means that, especially in Spain, the problem of ethno-territorial conflicts after centuries of history and also since the transition from the Franco regime[3] on democracy has by no means lost its explosiveness.

1.1. Goals of work

The aim of this work is to investigate whether there is a nationally unifying, collective identity in Spain today, or whether different collective identities still prevail in different sub-regions. These identities are analyzed in terms of their objective differences, such as language and parties, their collective ties to the nation and the regions, and their understanding of democracy. In this way, the contribution of identities to the national self-image of Spain and their favorable or hindering attitudes towards democracy can be determined.

1.2. Problem sketching and questions

Spain, one of the oldest nation-states in Europe, was dominated for a long time by strong centralism, which was only briefly interrupted twice by decentralized forms. In 1978 a new constitution came into force, which resulted in the division of Spain into "nation", "nationalities" and "regions". The resulting territorial distribution of power should end the central state and create a democratic constitutional state between political centralism and a unitary state as well as a decentralized version (Nohlen / Hildenbrand 199a: 294).

Since 1983 there have been 17 autonomous regions in Spain, the so-called "Comunidades Autónomas". This new division of territories represents a profound change in the history of Spain. Due to the suppression of ethnic and national identities as well as any regional independence of the individual parts of the country in Spain during the Franco regime (1939-1975), new regionalist regions appeared in almost all areas[4] Forces to the fore. In the Basque Country and Catalonia in particular, efforts to achieve national emancipation are increasingly evident. To this day, the "regional question"[5] not resolved in Spain, and continues to determine the problem of "peripheral or local nationalisms and regionalisms"[6] the headlines in Spanish newspapers. In addition, this problem became an important touchstone for Spain's young democracy (Nohlen / Hildenbrand 1992a: 294).

Given the transition phase[7] and nationalistic developments in the individual peripheries, it is questionable whether at that time, at the beginning of the constitution, a Spanish nation was created as a national identity that united citizens, or whether individual ethnic reference communities still predominate in the regions. Based on this, the following initial research questions should be answered:

Is there a nationally unifying, collective identity of the “Spaniards” or are the regional identities still predominant or more pronounced? Are the identities of the regions predominantly as ethnic or demotic[8] to call?

In sociological and normative theory of democracy, the relationship between ethnic pluralism and stable democratic rule has repeatedly been judged to be problematic (Kraus 1996: 50). A look at history and current events shows that " the simultaneous use of the democratic principle and the principle of nationality - understood as the right to self-determination of politically mobilized ethnic groups - in the most varied of geographical and cultural contexts, ... has led and continues to lead to violent political disputes "(Kraus 1996: 50).

National or regional identities are also sometimes critical of their own nation, as is the case in the Spanish Basque Country or Catalonia. Based on objective differences, these collective identities express themselves in the form of nationalis[6] see chapter 2.2.1.1., 2.2.1.2. mus or regionalism up to separatism[9] (Schmitt-Egner 1999: 141). Attempts by the government to adapt and consolidate political and institutional stability often lead in multiethnic states to the breakup of the state or to an authoritarian system of government (Moreno, 1998: 2).

But ethno-territorial differences within pluralistic societies do not necessarily have to lead to conflicts and divergences; cultural coexistence can also strengthen them[10] contribute to democracy.

This raises the research question of the extent to which the individual collective identities found tend to contribute to stability or instability[11] contribute to Spanish democracy. The second research objective of this thesis is the determination of the relationship between identities and democracy.

1.3. Structure of the work

The first, theoretical part of this work consists in the typological separation of the concept of nation on the basis of perspectives from sociological and political science discussions. In order to arrive at a clear definition of “nation”, an overview of various explanatory approaches is offered, the “region” is described in terms of definition and Spain is classified.

This is followed by a typological distinction between the ethnic and demotic concept of the nation according to Francis (1965), including the concepts associated with it today and his criticism, in order to then arrive at the concepts of identity. These play an important role for the empirical evaluation.

Within the framework of these identity theories, the theory of social identity Tajfels (1975, 1982) is taken up, linked to the concept of nation and related to the problems mentioned.

The Spanish situation will then be discussed. This chapter contains the history and the current situation, the state structure and the regionalisms of the peripheral regions of Spain. They are divided into three stages of development according to Miroslav Hroch (1968) and assigned historically in order to then characterize them more precisely.

Finally, the theoretical part presents the latest empirical findings on the research of national and regional identity in Spain as well as the hypotheses derived from the theory. In the practical part, these are based on a secondary analysis of the World Values ​​Survey (WVS)[12] checked.

The characteristics of the Spanish data follow the presentation of the data set. Then the variables and the further procedure are described.

2. Theoretical approaches

In addition to political science approaches, historical backgrounds and the current state of research on the topic are important.

2.1. States, Nations and Regions

When nation states are mentioned, the state is not synonymous with the nation, because they do not have to be congruent. A nation-state can theoretically comprise several nations (Fröschl / Mesner / Ra’anan 1991: 33). In some cases the state is bigger than the nation or vice versa. So the borders of the state do not necessarily coincide with the nation. Likewise, loyalty and ties to a state and a nation can conflict with one another (Fröschl / Mesner / Ra’anan 1991: 24). A distinction must therefore be made between nation and state.

The state is often described as a political unit capable of acting (Kluxen-Pyta 1990: 121), which is supposed to guarantee the coexistence of people in a community (Nohlen 2001: 476). Nation, on the other hand, is considered to be a real community which, for ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical and / or political reasons, feels that it belongs together and is different from others (Nohlen 2001: 313). National feeling is the awareness of belonging to a community through nationality and is more concrete than general state awareness. The nation exists today as a social component: the national identity[13] is experienced as that of the community, the large social group or the state (Kluxen-Pyta 1990: 121). Among the countless attempts at definition and typologies of the concept of a nation, a distinction is often made between objective and subjective elements when determining the term “nation”.

2.1.1. Objective and subjective concept of nation

The objective-cultural view defines the nation in terms of a general culture, while the subjective view, on the other hand, particularly emphasizes the political character of the nation (Richter 1994: 313). Table 1 shows the main features of these two models:

Table 1: Objective and subjective concept of nation

Figure not included in this excerpt

Source: own illustration (cf. Schieder 1965, Kohn 1945, Richter 1994, Puhle 1994)

Under the eastern nation model[14] This includes primarily nations in the eastern part of Europe as well as Germany (Kraus 1996: 60), where the nations were “state-building”. (National) states arise from state-separated parts of nations (Puhle 1994: 197). The subjective element comes mainly from the French tradition of thought and was more influential in Western Europe (cf. Renan 1882). France or England are classic examples (Schieder 1965: 69). Nations are pure communities of will of people (Westle 1999b: 20).According to this principle there was a "nation-building"[15]because it was the new states that supported the creation of nations (Fröschl / Mesner / Ra’anan 1991: 32).

The two models just presented are hardly available in their pure form today, just as the “nation state” is extremely rare. The defining characteristics of nations are too narrow and situational (Nohlen 2001: 314).

When trying to define the term “nation”, the combination of objective and subjective elements is common today. Objective components are considered to be the predecessors of the subjective components. In the case of subjective elements, the focus is on community awareness and / or a feeling of togetherness, which can then further develop into a political will to belong together (Westle 1999b: 21). For a more detailed theoretical analysis, reference is made to Estel (1994), who merges both elements in his nation definition [16]. But the value of the combinations of subjective and objective elements to explain the nation definition remains questionable, since this typological separation leads to internal contradictions (Westle, 1999b: 24). For these reasons Spain is mentioned in chapter 2.1.3. otherwise classified and then under Chapter 2.2. resorted to an analytical separation of the concept of nations, which forms the further basis of the understanding of nations in this work.

2.1.2. Regions as sub-units of the nation

Despite efforts by the “nation states” to achieve uniformity, there are still territorial and cultural differentiations of nations. A region is an area that is viewed as a unit because of mostly objective, historical, ethnic, cultural or religious similarities of its population (Münch / Meerwaldt 2002: 5). These subnational units of nations are often historically grown regions that cannot always be brought into line with modern politico-administrative countries, districts or counties. Like the nation, they can be understood not only as a territorial entity, but also through specific cultural influences. These may partly be in addition to national specifications, but partly also in competition with them[17] (Bornewasser / Wakenhut, 1999: 55). Members of the regions, like the citizens of a nation, thus form regional awareness and identity, which can experience various reasons.

2.1.3. The classification of Spain based on the types of society by Haller

The analytical order categories in objective and subjective determination of nations are, as already mentioned above, problematic in their applicability or not applicable to the Spanish “nation state”. An assignment to one of these models would show deficiencies (e.g. lack of a general culture, lack of a typical folk spirit, loyalty and ties to the state) or be presented as inadequate. Spain is made up of several different regions and nationalities[18]who partially see themselves as a nation. Francis has this form of government as a nation state[19] designated. (Beck 1977: 799, Lepsius 1986: 757).

Other authors have also dealt with the multi-ethnic problem. Max Haller's typology of societies is also valid for the Spanish state. He differentiates these according to their internal ethno-national structure, whether ethnic or national subgroups occur in a society, based on their numerical strength, the degree of territorial concentration within the country and the socio-cultural strength of these subgroups. He differentiates into ethnic homogeneous societies, pluriethnic societies[20], Minority societies and multinational societies a unit which, according to this understanding, has a natural right to the outside world, and which should therefore also establish or keep its own, the nation-state. ”(Estel, 1994: 19) (1993: 35). According to Haller, the nation state of Spain can be classified into the latter two types of society.

In the minority societies there is a socio-culturally and politically dominant majority opposed to smaller ethnic-national minority groups in the periphery of the state, which clearly articulate their particularism culturally and politically. With regard to the Galicians and Valencians (see Chapter 3.3.) Haller describes Spain as a minority society (1993: 36).

Haller describes the second type, the multinational society, as:

„ ... Societies with two or more ethnic-national subgroups of considerable strength, a high cultural level and a considerable degree of political organization and political influence "(Haller, 1993: 37).

Due to the extraordinary socio-political articulation of the subgroups formed by the Basques and Catalans, Spanish society can also be characterized as a multinational society (Haller 1993: 37). Juan Linz expresses this ethnic plurality as follows:

Spain today is ... the largest and most complex multilingual and ... multinational society in Western Europe”(Linz 1989: 262).

So Spain is ethnically plural[21] Nationality state with official recognition of different cultural affiliations of the citizens, which are connected via common political institutions (Heckmann 1992: 210ff).

Pluriethnic societies contain several ethnic subgroups, which often elude precise quantitative and qualitative determination (Haller 1993: 35f).

2.2 Typological differentiation of the national self-image: Ethnos - Demos - Concept according to Francis

In German usage, Francis (1965) introduced a typological distinction between the term “ethnos” and “demos”, or the intermingling terms of “people” and “nation”, which Lepsius (1986) expanded upon . In his work, Francis criticizes previous attempts to define nations based on their variable relation to reality. They are derived from the “world of ideas of modern nationalism” (Francis 1965: 78), which “is primarily aimed at shaping the political order” (Francis 1965: 78). He traces the variable real reference back to two opposing basic types of the national idea. These are used in the creation and maintenance of nation states.

2.2.1. The ethnos (nationalist model)

In the first type from which the national idea grows, the national territory and the ethnos, i.e. a “people” as a cultural or ethnic “unit”, including its space, must coincide (Francis 1965: 74). The “ethnos” thus becomes a nation when national unity arises through the congruence of ethnic and state borders (Kraus 1996: 62). The “ethnos” in the narrow sense means a collective identification based on the idea of ​​a community of descent. In a broad sense, it includes the ideas of a culturally or historically determined community of fate. In addition, it is “indifferent to the form of political order” (Westle 1999a: 280) and is only focused on exclusion between states (Westle 1999b: 27).

According to Francis, the ethnic concept of nation calls for:

to unite an ethnos that is divided by political borders in a state that belongs to it alone, or to grant regional autonomy or state independence to an ethnos that is incorporated into a larger political unit “(Francis 1965: 88).

Where this does not succeed, according to Francis, minority problems arise (1965: 88).

The nationalistic interests of an ethnic minority or region often become “ethnic nationalism”[22] or separatism - those of the center identify with "civic nationalism"[23] (Kößler / Schiel 1995: 15). The distinction between ethnos and demos as well as overlaps with the objective and subjective concept of nation become visible here (Richter 1994: 313).

2.2.1.1. Ethnic nationalism

According to ethnos, the same criteria apply to nationalism, such as the internal homogeneity of the members of a nation (exclusivity) (Richter 1994: 312f). Nationalism represents a social movement and ideology that is territorially and value-oriented towards the nation or the nation-state and requires conscious identification and solidarity with the national community (Nohlen 2001: 314).

Ethnic groups and national movements are often suspected of having separatist potential and tend to turn into "ethno-nationalism" (Kößler / Schiel 1995: 15). Ethnic conflicts are also referred to as “center-periphery conflicts” according to Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 14). These are conflicts that compete for the territorial control of political, economic and cultural resources within a state area or within parts of a state area (Rokkan / Urwin 1983: 14). The state is the main addressee of ethnic mobilizations as an “ascription authority” and representation of communal identities as well as through its exercise of administrative control and the distribution of economic resources (Rokkan / Urwin 1983: 14).

The forms of action of such movements range from verbal forms of articulation, the organization of protest actions and the establishment of political parties to violence and terror. A suitable example is the Spanish Basque Country or the ETA[24] Your demands are directed at the national level, while the (violent) actions also affect the less radical population groups in the region. In this group, separatist tendencies often compete with less radical forms of self-government, such as autonomy or federalism (Nohlen 2001: 445). Therefore, the term regionalism should be introduced at this point.

2.2.1.2. Regionalism

regionalism[25] means that ethnically-mobilized groups (Haller 1993: 44) exclude the existing spaces of the nation-state on the basis of socio-cultural tailoring of their region and with the assertion of their homogeneity. In doing so, they fall back on the characteristics that constitute them, which determine their identity in order to sufficiently differentiate themselves from the large group (Puhle 1994: 197). The transition from weaker levels of regionalism to nationalism is therefore consistently fluid (Puhle 1994: 193). In Spain, both terms are sometimes used synonymously and the regionalisms in the regions are often referred to as “mini-nationalisms” (Yun, 1990: 532). Because regionalist movements can, under certain circumstances, develop into natio

2.2.2. The demos (patriotic model)

The second type of national idea, the demotic understanding of nations, relates only to the question of those entitled to rule within the state (Westle 1999b: 27). For Francis, the democratic principle represents the relationship between “those who are subject to rule and those who rule in a given state”, i.e. between demos and the state (Francis 1965: 74).

Lepsius (1986) goes even further and defines the demos as “the bearer of political sovereignty, which in democratic systems should be the entire population. It is integrated into the political order, is part of an independent, supra-ethnic solidarity association that civilizes inter-ethnic relationships ”(Lepsius, 1986: 756). The demos thus refers to the “people” as the bearer of political sovereignty (Lepsius 1986: 753). The demotically oriented, national identification is concentrated on the acceptance of democratic self-determination (Lepsius, 1986: 753).

According to Francis, the demos is not related to the idea of ​​ethnos, since the democratic principle presupposes the existence of a demos as the legitimate bearer of political will, but does not require its ethnic homogeneity (Westle 199: 28). Ethnic aspects play only a subordinate role or no role at all (Richter, 1994: 313). Due to its integration into a political order, the "Demos" according to Francis is constitutionally specifically defined. The political constitution of the demo is a value decision of its own, which never refers to a specific chic regional special position in cultural, economic and political matters (Nohlen 2001: 430). sal of a people. Therefore, the criteria for the constitution of the demos can neither be derived from ascribed properties nor from a reconstruction of its history (Lepsius 1986: 756). The ethnic-cultural national idea and the politically democratic constitution of the citizen nation are thus sharply separated (Lepsius 1986: 755).

In addition to "ethnic" nationalism, there is also "civic nationalism" or patriotism according to the demotic type of nation. In terms of its ethnic significance, it “should not be based solely on its factual origin from a nation, but rather on the morality associated and mediated with the nationally shaped community” (Kluxen-Pyta 1990: 124). In general, it includes all political-cultural groups and is described as liberal, willful, universalistic and “good” (Brubaker 1999: 56). In addition, diversity within society, democratic principles, co-determination and taking constitutional rights seriously are characteristic (Schmidt 1998: 270). In addition to the constitution, democratic political institutions are, among other things, reference points for democracy-promoting patriotism (Nohlen 2001: 314).

The demotic definition of a nation is thus ascribed a greater compatibility with democracy than the ethnic definition of a nation, since it is closely linked to the concept of democracy. It is also attributed a higher ability to be peaceful both internally and externally, as it is ethnically mixed (Westle, 1999a: 280). The following table No. 2 shows the two types of state understanding once again:

Table 2: Summary of ethical / demotic understanding of nations

Figure not included in this excerpt

Source: own illustration (cf. Francis 1965, Lepsius 1986)

2.2.3. Summary discussion and criticism

According to Francis and Lepsius, the ethnos must not have any effect on the constitution of the demos. The appreciation of ethnic characteristics as determinants of the political constitution, the derivation of the formation of the demos from characteristics of the "ethnos" tends to lead to a concealment of political value decisions (Lepsius 1986: 756). It follows that equating demos as bearers of political sovereignty with ethnos leads to the oppression or forced assimilation of other ethnic, cultural, religious or socio-economic parts of the population within a political association (Lepsius 1986: 753).

This equation has repeatedly led to political disputes in a wide variety of geographical and cultural contexts. Ethnic pluralism in nation states and stable democratic rule have repeatedly been judged as problematic in normative democracy theory (Kraus 1996: 50). Ethnic-regional conflicts depend to a large extent on the character of the political constitution of a society as well as on the actions of the central state (Haller 1993: 45).

Tensions in multiethnic states such as Spain can lead to major conflicts, but do not have to. There is also the other extreme: the complete satisfaction and integration of the tension between central and regional interests, which is based on the inclusion of regional peculiarities in the national culture, in their recognition as legitimate, constitutive components of the “nation”. In this way, ethnicity can be understood as a contribution to national culture that increases its diversity and wealth (Kößler / Schiel 1995: 16f). In the long term, the existence of a “multinational society” is only possible in centralist authoritarian states or in federally constituted democratic states (Haller 1993: 45).

The typological separation between ethnos and demos or between the ethnic-cultural national idea and the normative connection between a democratic constitution and the demotic concept of nation has, however, been criticized from various sides in recent years (cf. , Kraus 1996). Among other things, it is criticized that the contrasts of "ethnic nation" and "civic nation" (ethnic and demotic nation) that echo in the separation of ethnos and demos rarely occur in their pure form in reality. The problem arises that the national reality repeatedly blurs the boundaries between these ideal types (Kraus, 1996: 61). There are hardly any demotic nations that orient themselves only on the principle of cultural neutrality, but rather they tend to assimilate minority cultures. Today, a coexistence in the collective self-understanding of both principles of ethnos and demos in Western European countries is assumed (Westle 1999a: 280).

In addition, the politicization of ethnicity can be seen as the starting point for the emergence of a nationalist movement. This politicization often makes it impossible to maintain a clear conceptual separation between an “ethnic group”, a nationality and - as soon as a politicized ethnic community has institutionalized group rights - a “nation” as a political association.The transitions between the concepts develop fluently (Kraus 1996: 61).

Another point is that in the modern world society of nation states only a few examples of democracies can be found that did not also emerge in an ethnic context. It therefore only plays a subordinate role whether a nation-state sees itself as a product of state nationalism (the state creates the nation) or of ethnonationalism (the nation produces "its" state): The symbiosis of both types of nationalism with the idea of ​​popular sovereignty was shown in the Results similar to practice (Kraus 1996: 67).

For empirical research, the question does not arise here whether only the analytical concept of the demotic nation-state is able to grasp national identity phenomena. In this case, the ideal-typical distinction between ethnos and demos is quite substantial and helpful in the empirical analysis. This typology represents an analytical instrument for examining its empirical reality content in Spain (Westle 1999b: 35). Through the typological distinction between ethnos and demos, corresponding changes in national identity within states towards a more ethnic or demotic character can be worked out (Westle 1999b: 35).

2.3. Identity Concepts

Like the concept of nation, the concepts of national identity at the micro level also exhibit a wide range and competing ideas. Therefore, above all, the relevant theories of collective and national identity for the research project are presented, which are based on the social-psychological theory of social identity by Tajfel and Turner (1986).

2.3.1. Concept of identity and collective identity as part of social identity

The term “identity” is often used in political science and social psychological work. In the political science sense, it is often used in the sense of a sense of belonging (Riketta / Wakenhut 1998: 17) or it is based on historical research on nation building (Westle 1999b: 35). Social psychological approaches, which today are linked to the political science and sociological concepts of nations, are based on the concept of social identity (Tajfel / Turner 1986) as well as their further precision in the theory of self-categorization (cf. Turner 1987, Oakes et al. 1994 ). Personal and group identities play an important role here (Westle 1999b: 35), the formation of nationality is regarded as a form of social categorization (Nicklas 1996: 77).

Human individuals have an emotional need to identify with other human individuals and social groups, i.e. to develop social identities in addition to their individual or personal identity. Social identity is the identity conveyed through membership in groups through to participation in collectives such as gender or nation. It is the prerequisite for collective identity (Weller 1999: 265f).

This collective identity is the product of communication and interaction within a social group that is aware of certain, more or less objectifiable commonalities (ingroup). It emphasizes these similarities as a distinction from other individuals and groups (outgroup) as identity-forming. This means that through the self-image and we-consciousness of a group of individuals, they set themselves apart from their environment through certain similarities (Weller 1999: 266f). On the basis of the social identity of this identity theory, it is possible to analyze very different collective identities. People can assign themselves to a territorial collective, be it local, autonomous, national or international. There are different levels with different sizes of the collective (city, village, region, Spain, continent, world) (Sangrador Garcia 1996: 26).

2.3.2. National and regional identity

National and regional identity are specific forms of collective identity (Weller 1999: 259). On the one hand, they are based on the subjective identification with the “nation” or “region” and the emotional evaluation of this as a whole (Schmidt 1998: 270). With “collective identity”, the focus is primarily on the subjective aspect of the community. However, common objective characteristics such as language, culture or history also play an important role as important identification characteristics for these identities (Weller 1999: 259). This is also expressed in Estel's definition of collective, national identity. It is based on the construction of a common history that is disseminated by national political-cultural elites and transformed into a generally binding social order by these elites (Estel 1994: 44). Objective characteristics represent the substantive basis for national identity here.

For some people, belonging to a collective, nation or region is very important, for others it is not. The respective extreme poles are not considered to be too favorable (nationalism or insufficient national awareness) (Sangrador-Garcia 1996: 26). This means that national identity can develop positive or negative political functions: Analogous to the national distinction in demos and ethnos, a distinction is made here between healthy patriotism and excessive nationalism (Westle 1999b: 37).

State, collective identity, the “national identity”, can compete with regional, ethnic and cultural identities (minority conflicts). In general, when collective, national and regional identities are complementary, they then favor vertical cooperation between nation and region. Instability in the form of conflicts (regionalism, nationalism) arises when the regional and the overriding identity are perceived as opposing or contradict each other (Schmitt-Egner 1999: 141).

Identities can also be ethnic or demotic. A larger collective can include several small identity groups that can deviate from the overarching “national identity”.

2.4. Historical development and current situation in Spain

For a long time Spain was considered an early unified European nation-state in historiography (Linz 1973: 32-116). But the social and cultural cohesion that make up the unity of Spain does not allow the internal contradictions and contradictions to fade.

Spain ... is a state for all Spaniards, a nation - state for a large part of the Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities”(Linz 1975: 423)

In the course of history it has been possible to use power-political means to form a legally and administratively united territory, i.e. a state. In view of the special development of the periphery, however, it remained problematic and questionable whether a nation was constructed as a cultural reference community with an identity that unites the citizens (Koninski 1982: 157). "State and nation building"[26] So there was a gap between them (Hettlage 1994: 166). Despite theoretical religious and political unity, diversity was the outstanding characteristic of Spanish history (Bernecker 2002: 7). As described above, this historical background did not contribute to the formation of a nation state, but a nation state. Tensions between political unification tendencies and cultural diversity have remained a basic feature of Spanish development to this day (Bernecker 2002: 8). Since above all newer tendencies are of relevance for this work, in the following the stage from the Franco regime onwards will be discussed in order to describe the current situation in Spain.

2.4.1. Historical evidence up to the Franco regime

Spain is characterized by the strong independent life of multiple regions, which have often seen themselves as nations. Four languages, own cultures, different legal systems and institutions are hallmarks of the Spanish development. This goes back to the conquest of the Islamic kingdoms, from which regionally different institutions and traditions developed (Puhle 1994: 190). The state structure was long an unstable alliance of Christian, independent kingdoms (Navarre, (Castile) -León, Aragón, Catalonia) (Hettlage 1994: 148) whose idea of ​​unity was based on the Christian opposition to the Islamic threat. Regional traditions, identifications and institutions were and are still in Spain - especially due to the personal union of the crown since Charles V - of strong impact and duration (Puhle 1994: 190).

Forced “state building” through absolutist standardization, centralization, expansion of state control and skimming off the central bureaucracy happened in three phases (Puhle 1994: 190): The first phase began with the takeover of power by the Bourbons at the beginning of the 18th century. Here Catalonia lost its own government, but not yet all rights and institutions. The Bourbon reforms deepened the centralization and expansion of the bureaucracy in the second half of the 18th century.

The second push relates to the removal of the regional pre- and autonomous rights after the end of the third Carlist Wars in 1868. The clear approaches to expanding state intervention in the economy and society up to the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920s also had a centralizing effect.

The intensifying third surge took place during the Franco regime. This represented the most extreme form of centralism in modern times (Puhle 1994: 191).

2.4.2. Authoritarian Franco regime

The civil war ended on April 1st, 1939[27] with the victory of the Frankists. Society was deeply divided into Frankist winners and Republican losers (Bernecker 2002: 171-174). Franco now saw the chance to create a united, free Greater Spain. Cultural, ethnic-regional differentiation had to be erased and a centralized, unitary state created (Hettlage 1994: 158f).

The decisive factor for the political process was the extraordinarily high concentration of power in the person of the head of state. He knew how to integrate the sometimes opposing social and ideological forces into the regime, to balance them out and, if necessary, to neutralize them. The Catholic state, monarchist form of government and class-like structure became mandatory for everyone. After the failure of the self-sufficiency policy[28] were conservative, technocratic elites in the 1960s[29] (Opus Dei) who came to the levers of power (cf. Bernecker 2002: 185ff).

With its tough measures, the centralist Franco regime had tried to suppress all efforts towards individual character or independence (Nohlen / Hildenbrand 1992a: 295). Culturally, the unity of Spain under Franco was symbolized by a unified culture and language. Differentiation meant separatism. Castilian was the only official language and the symbol of the unity of the nation. The regions with the greatest regional awareness, the Basque Country and Catalonia, were hardest hit. There, under Franco, the use of the "regional languages" in public and administration was banned (Gonzáles Encinar, 1992: 218). In addition, the regions lost all right to determine economic, domestic, cultural and social policy (Hettlage 1994: 158f). The foreign occupation forces from Madrid revived the cultural minority consciousness even more and strengthened internal solidarity (Waldmann, 1989: 69f). Despite Franco's attempts to destroy regional identities, regionalism flourished in Spain as a cultural, linguistic, political and economic phenomenon (Hettlage, 1994: 161).

It was not until the 1970s that Spain was able to move towards democracy. This democratization process did not result, as is often the case in totalitarian regimes, from a revolutionary movement, but from the political institutions of the regime. It happened on the one hand through pressure from outside (demand from other European countries for democratization, economic crisis) and on the other hand through pressure from within (economic elites, king) (Nohlen / Hildenbrand 1992a: 276f). Even in Franco's lifetime, the regime's leeway for elite competition became too narrow, but no one dared to shake Franco's fortress at that time. But this competition was already geared towards the day after. The Frankist elites knew that Franco was unique and irreplaceable. With his death, his Frankism also had to go under (Nohlen / Hildenbrand, 1992a: 274-275).

The political decentralization after Franco's death on November 20, 1975 represented one of the most profound changes in the history of Spain. As a result of developments in the periphery, a democratic new beginning after Franco's death first had to resolve the regional issue (Hettlage 1994: 160).

2.4.3. Change to a democratic EU state and a new constitution

During the transition phase or the transition to democracy, the authoritarian structures of Frankism were dismantled at a rapid pace and replaced by democratic institutions. Basques and Catalans called for the restoration of their institutions and self-government. Demands for autonomy were also made in the other regions. Confrontations between different positions then resulted in a constitutional compromise (Hettlage 1994: 163). The democratic constitution was passed by parliament at the end of October 1978 after intensive discussion (Hettlage 1994: 164). The asymmetrical state[30] (González Encinar 1992: 227) is now a democratic and social constitutional state. The sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, from whom all powers of the state emanate. The form of government is a parliamentary monarchy, whereby the king is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and his crown is inherited (del Burgo 2001: 21).

The constitution is based on the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" (Art. 2 Spanish constitution), at the same time recognizes the existence of nationalities and regions and grants them the right to autonomy[31] a (del Burgo 2001: 21). Nationalities and regions therefore have the “right to self-administration” (González Encinar 1992: 221f), or an autonomous status (del Burgo 2001: 21).

The 17 autonomous regions of Spain formed from 1979 to 1982 (del Burgo 2001: 21). By separating nationalities and regions, the ideas of historical nationalities (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) were taken into account (Hettlage 1994: 163-164). Although the existence of “nationalities” is recognized, there is only one nation in terms of the constitution (del Burgo 2001: 21).

The distribution of competences between the central state and the autonomous communities was one of the most controversial questions when the constitution was drafted (Nohlen / Hildenbrand 1992a: 318) and will be examined in more detail below.

2.4.4. Distribution of competencies within Spain

Spain is not a federation of states, but neither is it a central state. For political reasons, the Spanish constitutional fathers at the time favored the concept of territorial autonomy (López-Pina 2001: 5) or asymmetrical federalism for the territorial order[32] decided (Schneckener / Senghaas 1997: 18). While territorial autonomy is a form of decentralization, federalism is based on a polycentric structure. Territorial autonomy can be understood as the delegation of powers to a lower level, which is achieved through simple laws (Statute of Autonomy [33] ) as well as through a "constitutional right to autonomy". Federalism, on the other hand, involves a constitutionally guaranteed division of power between the state as a whole and federal member states (Schneckener / Senghaas 1997: 16).

The concept of territorial autonomy refers to self-government for a specific area, mostly a historical region, in which a national minority is the local majority. (Schneckener / Senghaas 1997: 16f).

The following are important criteria for the degree of autonomy:

1.) the existence of elected decision makers
2.) the possibilities of your own legislation
3.) independent financial management (e.g. through tax sovereignty) (Suksi 1997: 225).

All regions in Spain have the same elected bodies: governments and legislative parliaments, each standing next to the Spanish parliament. The president of the autonomous community is the head of the respective government or executive. He is at the same time the highest representative of the autonomous community and representative of the state in it. Parliament elects him from among its members. The parliaments themselves are formed from general and direct elections[34] (See Nohlen / Hildenbrand 1992a: 315ff).

The possibility of legislation is regulated in the Spanish Constitution. It contains a catalog of subject areas that belong to the exclusive competence of the central authority (Art. 149 Para. 1 CE), and it also stipulates that matters not expressly assigned to the state can be taken over by the Autonomous Community in the Statute of Autonomy (Art. 149 Paragraph 3 sentence 1CE). However, all matters belong to the state that have not previously been clearly assigned to the state or included in the Statute of Autonomy. In addition, the autonomous communities can take on differently many and far-reaching competencies (Ibler 2001: 34).

The competences that were transferred from the central government to the regional parliaments and governments on the basis of the constitution and the statute of autonomy concentrate on areas of internal communication, culture and education, certain regulatory functions, institutional regulations and the coordination of local institutions, local administrative actions and local taxes (Puhle 1994: 206). In general, the regulation can be described as relatively friendly to the central government (Ibler 2001: 34).

In the context of financial management, the regulations for interregional financial equalization between the regions and the head office clearly preferred the “strong” regions (Puhle 1994: 206). The exception is the Basque Country, which due to traditional privileges ("fueros") is the only Spanish "Communidad" to have a constitutionally guaranteed tax and financial sovereignty (Schneckener / Senghaas 1997: 17), as well as the Catalans, who have also received a special agreement (cf. Puhle 1994: 206). Otherwise there is hardly any possibility of raising your own taxes in Spain. The autonomous regions are generally financed from taxes that are collected by the state and to which the autonomous areas have a legal claim (e.g. inter-territorial compensation fund). This analysis shows that most of the autonomous areas are financially dependent on the central government, which repeatedly gives rise to conflicts between the two levels (Schneckener / Senghaas 1997: 17).

Through separate regulations with regard to the skill levels[35] and financial equalization, three classes of autonomy have now been established:

Catalonia and the Basque Country, which are wholly or predominantly governed by their respective “nationalist” parties, the other large, strong cultural regions such as Galicia, Asturias, Valencia and also Andalusia, Aragón and the island regions (Canary Islands, Balearic Islands) and the rest of the autonomous communities (Puhle 1994: 206). As a final assessment, the opportunities for participation of the CCAA[36] describe themselves as weak in terms of influencing the legislation of the entire state, securing independence through financial distribution and giving oneself a constitution. Overall, the Spanish distribution of power has clear tendencies towards the central state (Ibler 2001: 36-41).

2.5. Developments in nationalisms and regionalisms

For many, Spain was only a state, but not a nation (cf. Linz 1973: 79). Different regions in Spain show different manifestations of nationalism or regionalism. This affects the two historical nationalities Basque Country and Catalonia most. They still show the greatest tensions and are characterized in more detail below as the smaller regionalisms.

2.5.1. Peripheral nationalisms in Catalonia and the Basque Country

According to Gerhard Brunn (1999: 29), the Basque and Catalan national movements are movements of nations that assert the right to a state of their own and have finally been satisfied with the demand for extensive autonomy within the Spanish state. However, they represent a classic example of regionalist movements practicing “region building” as well as cultural national movements “nation building”. These then sometimes expand into national movements, especially when they justify their demands ethnically and with an independent story, whether real or fictitious. Basque nationalism is often referred to as mini nationalism (Brunn 1999: 29).

In the comparative analysis of the national movements, Miroslav Hroch suggested to the “small” mostly East or East Central European peoples to distinguish between three stages of development on the way to political nationalism (1968: 24-26). These can also be seen in the Western European cases:

Figure 1: Development phases of nationalism

Figure not included in this excerpt

Source: own illustration (cf. Hroch 1968).

Based on this typology, Gerhard Brunn dated the beginning of the first development phase of Catalan nationalism (see following chapter) to 1840, that of the second phase to 1880 and that of the third phase to 1901 (consolidation of the national movement as a party) (1978a: 294f ).

Analogous to this, Puhle dated Basque nationalism three decades late: the first phase began around the mid-1870s, the second phase began around the mid-1990s (Sabino Arana's organization was founded) and the breakthrough to the third phase after 1931 (the beginning of the Republic, electoral successes of the PNV) (1982: 60f).

2.5.1.1. Catalan nationalism

In Catalonia, as in the Basque Country, (ethnic) nationalism is of paramount importance. The cultural nationalism ("renaixença", regional movement) that has been expressed since the middle of the 19th century followed the pattern of other nationalist movements in Western Europe. The "Renaixença", which was shaped by the revival of Catalan historical awareness, the Catalan language and literature, gradually developed into a political autonomy movement (national movement, 1880 1st Catalanist Congress) (Bernecker 2002: 138), which among other things resulted from socio-economic structural contradictions arose between the center and the periphery. Since the industrialization of Catalonia had progressed much further than in the rest of the regions since the second half of the 19th century, political effects also began to show. Almost half of Spain's industrial tax revenue was generated in the Catalan region in 1918. The agricultural sector was a lot more productive and competitive than the center (Hettlage 1994: 194).

This "national regionalism" of Catalonia was initially oriented towards the construction of a modern, Catalan society, later called for a political and legal re-Catalanization (e.g. restoration of Catalan jurisdiction, political decision-making authority) (Hettlage 1994: 154), historical individuality of Catalonia and turned against this Unitarian regime of Spain. The special awareness touched with the distance of the Catalans to the center of Madrid. Spain was recognized as a state, but not as a nation (Bernecker 2002: 138). With the support of progress-oriented industrial citizens, the regionalist league of Catalonia (1901) was able to develop a political, reform-oriented mass movement that firmly anchored the question of regional autonomy as a political demand for its dominant goal (Hettlage 1994: 155). The conservative autonomist party became the leading power in several areas of Catalonia (Bernecker 2002: 140). The nationalism supported by all classes of the people then became particularly active in the last two decades of systematic repression by the Franco regime. After the transition to bourgeois democracy (transition), 1.5 million Catalans demonstrated for autonomy on September 11, 1977 (Nohlen / Hildenbrand 1992a: 297).

Today, as a historical nationality with a special statute, Catalonia has a high level of competencies for self-government (see Chapter 2.4.4.). Within the autonomous state, however, from an institutional point of view (at the meso level[37] ) shows no fundamental differences to the other regions and institutions (normal financing system in contrast to the Basque Country) (Kraus 1996: 211).

But Catalonia is a community with a relatively strong will for autonomy. Because of its own cultural, political and economic weight, Catalonia has a key position in the Spanish state (Kraus 1996: 211). For example, it took an active role in establishing the foundations of the autonomous state (Kraus 1996: 212).

Catalonia had long been characterized by an intense tradition of immigration - a phenomenon which, in quantitative terms, assumed much larger dimensions during the Franco regime, but without the possibility of integrating migrants (Kraus 1996: 214). All Spanish citizens residing in Catalonia are politically and legally considered to be Catalans by the Statute of Autonomy (Article 6). The clear renunciation of political emphasis on cultural dividing lines forms the self-image of all important currents of Catalanism[38] (Kraus 1996: 233). Both left-wing and right-wing Catalan parties hold this view. Catalan nationalism therefore approximates the type of “open” nationalism, based on the concept of Hans Kohn (1968: 66), which, on the basis of political-territorial organizational principles, seeks to absorb “foreign” cultural elements. The intention to preserve one's own culture therefore in no way means isolation from external influences (Conversi 1990: 63). This “official” complex definition of the Catalan identity as ethnonational

The social structure dimension is supplemented in the second part by the subjective attitudes on the micro level (see chapter 4.1ff) (Kraus 1996: 233).

Furthermore, the language is a core component of the ethnic differentiation in Catalonia. It has been the constitutive feature of Catalan particularism since the second half of the 19th century. All currents of political Catalanism derive the legitimacy of their demands for autonomy vis-à-vis the central state from the existence of a language of their own. Ethnic nationalism in Catalonia, then and now, is essentially articulated as a linguistic nationalism (Conversi 1993: 191f). However, the Spanish constitution clearly identifies Castilian as the only official language of the entire national territory. The political system grants the nationalities linguistic rights, but does not release them from their linguistic obligations towards the Spanish state (Kraus 1996: 257b).

The Catalan party system corresponds to the type of moderate pluralism. Among the regionalist parties founded since 1968 were the moderate-conservative CiU (Convergència i Unió[39] ), and the left-wing nationalist ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Cataluna[40] ) to the main representatives of Catalanism, even if they define the concept in different ways. The CiU strives for an unlimited maximum of autonomy for Catalonia, but not for independence from the Spanish state (Kraus 1996: 218). In essence, the content is about the Catalan "nationbuilding". It is mainly supported by economic elites. The nationalism of the CiU can be described as moderate (Kraus 1996: 227).

[...]



[1] See chapter 2.

[2] Example: Catalonia

[3] See chapter 2.4., In particular 2.4.3.

[4] see chapter 2.2.1.2.

[5] see chapter 2.2.1.2., 2.5.

[7] Transition phase to democracy. Chapter 2.4.3.

[8] see chapter 2.2.

[9] Separatism means that they demand their own state and strive for independence as a political goal (Nohlen 2001: 445).

[10] This deepening takes place, among other things, through the committed participation of citizens in political decision-making and at all levels of the institutions

[11] also through the polarization of political opinion formation by the ethnic groups

[12] For a description of the data set, see Chapter 3: Presentation of the data set

[13] See chapter 2.3.2.

[14] In his historical-typological approach, Theodor Schieder (1965) divided the process of “nationalization” in modern Europe into three stages. The first phase: nation-state is formed through internal revolution based on the will of the people (France), second phase: nation creates nation-state from different nations (Germany), third phase: small states separate from major monarchies (Eastern Europe) (1965: 68-70) . Other authors (Kohn 1945, Meinecke 1908, Alter 1985, Richter, 1994) only find other names for the objective and subjective definition, such as Western and Eastern model or people or cultural nation and state or citizen nation.

[15] Overcoming traditional particular loyalties, solidarities and identities in favor of a new focus that the community of the nation to be built should give up. The building of nations is primarily assigned internal, i.e. integrating, consequences and functions (Richter 1994: 312).

[16] "A nation is a ... population that forms its own society based on the division of labor, including a modern one ... and the majority of its members see themselves as their own ethnic or historical unity, i.e. based on commonalities of collective, in particular: political fate;

[17] For example, Andalusia and Catalonia are on this side in terms of religious customs and beyond the political-administrative boundaries in terms of language (Goetze 1992: 190).

[18] In the case of the historical nationalities of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, the Spanish regions speak of nations or nationalities, otherwise regions.

[19] The prerequisite is that nationalities are to a greater or lesser extent subject to a superordinate system of rule, while nations are, in principle, sovereign in determining their political abilities. They have only relative autonomy within the state as a whole (Francis 1965: 180).

[20] Ethnically homogeneous societies: no significant ethnic subgroups.

[21] In this work “ethnic-plural” and “multiethnic” are used as general generic terms for all forms of socio-cultural (ethnic or national) differentiation within society.

[22] See the following chapter

[23] “Bourgeois nationalism”, demotic, see Chapter 2.2.2.

[24] ETA = Euskadi Ta Askatasuna = Basque Country and Freedom

[25] From a domestic perspective, regionalism is based on the internal differentiation of units into homogeneous, delimitable regional spaces, the emphasis on regional diversity and the partial function of forming nalist movements that strive to achieve the status of a nation-state for the nation (independence, separatism) (Schmitt- Egner 1999: 145). Regionalism usually doesn't go that far. At most he would like to achieve autonomy or an independent government, such as the Catalans (Schmitt-Egner 1999: 141).

[26] See chapters 2.1., 2.1.1.

[27] During the civil war of 1936-39, the Popular Front (socialists and communists, Republican left, regionalist forces and anarchists) and the National Front (Catholic conservatives, monarchists of various directions, right-wing Republicans and the fascist Falange (Franco party)) faced each other (Bernecker 2002: 167) . The civil war took a decisive turn due to the influence of the Axis powers (e.g. German-Italian military and troop aid). Thanks to this support, the national front or the Frankists were victorious in the end (Bernecker 2002: 173).

[28] Autarky: economic independence from abroad (Foreign Dictionary 1994: 89)

[29] Elite: minority that is superior to the rest of society and comes about through selection (Nohlen 2001: 73).

[30] See the following chapter: The organs and distribution of powers of the autonomous communities

[31] This right is exercised through the establishment of autonomous communities that have emerged from the former provinces through democratic processes.

[32] In asymmetrical federalism, the powers of the 17 "autonomous communities" are not distributed uniformly, they have different powers (Schneckener / Senghaas 1997: 18)

[33] Statutes of autonomy are special laws of the Spanish parliament, not constitutions of states (Ibler 2001: 35).

[34] For a description of the Spanish electoral system and its illustration, please refer to Chapter 2 of the Appendix. There are special regulations, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia, such as the premature dissolution of parliament or the motion of no confidence (only in the Basque Country towards the country ministers). Only the presidents of the autonomous communities of the Basque Country and Catalonia have the right to premature dissolution of parliament (Nohlen / Hildenbrand 1992a: 316).

[35] Matters in which the autonomies can exercise competencies

[36] Abbreviation for "Comunidades Autonomas" = autonomous regions of Spain

[37] Level between micro and macro level. The level of institutions, governments, etc.

[38] Catalan nationalism

[39] An overview of all Spanish parties is given under 4.1.5. given. CiU: Catalan nationalists, center-right

[40] Catalan left

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